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ABSTRACT
The discovery of frequent itemsets can serve valuable eco-
nomic and research purposes. Releasing discovered frequent
itemsets, however, presents privacy challenges. In this pa-
per, we study the problem of how to perform frequent item-
set mining on transaction databases while satisfying differ-
ential privacy. We propose an approach, called PrivBasis,
which leverages a novel notion called basis sets. A θ-basis
set has the property that any itemset with frequency higher
than θ is a subset of some basis. We introduce algorithms
for privately constructing a basis set and then using it to
find the most frequent itemsets. Experiments show that our
approach greatly outperforms the current state of the art.
1. INTRODUCTION
Frequent itemset mining is a well recognized data min-
ing problem. The discovery of frequent itemsets can serve
valuable economic and research purposes, e.g., mining as-
sociation rules [5], predicting user behavior [3], and find-
ing correlations [11]. Publishing frequent itemsets, however,
may reveal the information of individual transactions, com-
promising the privacy of them.
In this paper, we study the problem of how to perform fre-
quent itemset mining (FIM) on transaction databases while
satisfying differential privacy. Differential privacy [17] is an
appealing privacy notion which provides worst-case privacy
guarantees. In recent years, it has become the de facto stan-
dard notion of privacy for research in private data analysis.
The key challenge in private FIM is that the dimensionality
of transactional datasets is very high. While effective tech-
niques for differentially private data publishing have been
developed for low-dimensional datasets (e.g., [23, 33]), these
techniques do not apply to high-dimensional data. In fact,
even for the weaker privacy notion of k-anonymity, the curse
of high dimensionality effect is well known [4].
Our work is inspired by Bhaskar et al.’s KDD10 paper [8],
in which they propose an approach to privately publish top k
frequent itemsets and their frequencies. Their approach first
selects k itemsets from the set of all itemsets that include
at most m items, and then adds noise to the frequencies
of these selected itemsets. This approach works reasonably
well for small k values; however for larger values of k, the
accuracy is poor. The main reason is that for larger k values,
one has to set the size limit m to be larger (e.g., 3, 4, or
higher). This results in a very large candidate set from which
the algorithm must select the top k, making the selection
inaccurate.
In this paper we propose a novel approach that avoids the
selection of top k itemsets from a very large candidate set.
More specifically, we introduce the notion of basis sets. A
θ-basis set B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bw}, where each Bi is a set
of items, has the property that any itemset with frequency
higher than θ is a subset of some basis Bi. A good basis set
is one where w is small and the lengths of all Bi’s are also
small. Given a good basis set B, one can reconstruct the
frequencies of all subsets of Bi’s with good accuracy. One
can then select the most frequent itemsets from these. We
also introduce techniques to construct good basis sets while
satisfying differential privacy. Finally, we have conducted
extensive experiments, and the results show that our ap-
proach greatly outperforms the existing approach.
We call our approach PrivBasis. It meets the challenge of
high dimensionality by projecting the input dataset onto a
small number of selected dimensions that one cares about.
In fact, PrivBasis often uses several sets of dimensions for
such projections, to avoid any one set containing too many
dimensions. Each basis in B corresponds to one such set
of dimensions for projection. Our techniques enable one
to select which sets of dimensions are most helpful for the
purpose of finding the k most frequent itemsets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next
section introduces the background knowledge about differ-
ential privacy and frequent itemset mining. In Section 3
we analyze the state of the art on private FIM and identify
the challenges in this problem. Our approach is presented
in Section 4. We report experimental results in Section 5.
Section 6 reviews related work and Section 7 concludes our
work.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Differential Privacy
Informally, differential privacy requires that the output of
a data analysis mechanism be approximately the same, even
if any single tuple in the input database is arbitrarily added
or removed.
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Definition 1 (ǫ-Differential Privacy [16, 17]).
A randomized mechanism A gives ǫ-differential privacy if
for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D′, and any
S ∈ Range(A),
Pr [A(D) = S] ≤ eǫ · Pr [A(D′) = S] .
In this paper we consider two datasets D and D′ to be
neighbors if and only if either D = D′ + t or D′ = D + t,
where D + t denotes the dataset resulted from adding the
tuple t to the dataset D. We use D ≃ D′ to denote this.
This protects the privacy of any single tuple, because adding
or removing any single tuple results in eǫ-multiplicative-
bounded changes in the probability distribution of the out-
put. If any adversary can make certain inference about a tu-
ple based on the output, then the same inference is also likely
to occur even if the tuple does not appear in the dataset.
Differential privacy is composable in the sense that com-
bining multiple mechanisms that satisfy differential pri-
vacy for ǫ1, · · · , ǫm results in a mechanism that satisfies ǫ-
differential privacy for ǫ =
∑
i ǫi. Because of this, we refer
to ǫ as the privacy budget of a privacy-preserving data anal-
ysis task. When a task involves multiple steps, each step
uses a portion of ǫ so that the sum of these portions is no
more than ǫ.
There are several approaches for designing mechanisms
that satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. In this paper we use two
of them. The first approach computes a function g on the
dataset D in a differentially privately way, by adding to
g(D) a random noise. The magnitude of the noise depends
on GSf , the global sensitivity or the L1 sensitivity of g. Such
a mechanism Ag is given below:
Ag(D) = g(D) + Lap
(
GSg
ǫ
)
where GSg = max
(D,D′):D≃D′
|g(D)− g(D′)|,
and Pr [Lap (β) = x] = 1
2β
e−|x|/β
In the above, Lap (β) denotes a random variable sampled
from the Laplace distribution with scale parameter β. This
is generally referred to as the Laplacian mechanism for sat-
isfying differential privacy.
The second approach computes a function g on a dataset
D by sampling from the set of all possible answers in the
range of g according to an exponential distribution, with an-
swers that are “more accurate” will be sampled with higher
probability. This is generally referred to as the exponential
mechanism [28]. This approach requires the specification of
a quality function q : D × R → R, where the real valued
score q(D, r) indicates how accurate it is to return r when
the input dataset is D. Higher scores indicate more accurate
outputs which should be returned with higher probabilities.
Given the quality function q, its global sensitivity GSq is
defined as:
GSq = max
r
max
(D,D′):D≃D′
|q(D, r)− q(D′, r)|
The following method M satisfies ǫ-differential privacy:
Pr [M(D) = r] ∝ exp
(
ǫ
2GSq
q(D, r)
)
(1)
For example, if q(D, r1) − q(D, r2) = 1, then r1 should be
returns y times more likely than r2, with y = exp
(
ǫ
2GSq
)
.
The larger the exponent ǫ
2GSq
is, the more likely thatM will
return the higher quality result.
Symbol Description
D The transaction dataset
N The number of transactions in D
I The set of items
B The basis set
f(X) The frequency of itemset X
λ The number of unique items in the
set of top-k itemsets
fk The frequency of the k-th most fre-
quent itemset
Table 1: The notations
As pointed out in [28], in some cases the quality func-
tion satisfies the condition that when the input dataset is
changed from D to D′, the quality values of all outcomes
change only in one direction, i.e.,
∀D≃D′
[(∃r1 q(D, r1)<q(D′, r1))→(∀r2 q(D, r2)≤q(D′, r2))]
Then one can remove the factor of 1/2 in the exponent of
Equation (1) and return r with probability proportional to
exp
(
ǫ
GSq
q(D, r)
)
. This improves the accuracy of the result.
2.2 Frequent Itemset Mining
Frequent itemset mining (FIM) is a well studied problem
in data mining. It aims at discovering the itemsets that fre-
quently appear in a transactional dataset. More formally,
let I be a set of items and let D = [t1, t2, . . . , tN ] be a trans-
action dataset where ti ⊆ I, and N be the number of trans-
actions in D. The frequency of an itemset X ⊆ I, denoted
by f(X), is the fraction of transactions in D that include
X as a subset. Thus 0 ≤ f(X) ≤ 1 for any X. Given a
frequency threshold θ such that 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we say that an
itemset X is θ-frequent when f(X) ≥ θ.
The FIM problem can be defined as either taking the min-
imal frequency θ as input and returning all θ-frequent item-
sets together with their frequencies, or as taking an integer
k as input, and returning the top k most frequent itemsets,
together with their frequencies. One can easily convert one
version to the other.
Several algorithms have been proposed for finding fre-
quent itemsets. The two most prominent ones are the Apri-
ori algorithm [5], and the FP-Growth algorithm [22]. The
Apriori algorithm exploits the observation that if an item-
set X is frequent, then all its subsets must also be frequent.
The algorithm works by generating itemsets of length n from
itemsets of length n − 1, eliminating candidates that have
an infrequent pattern. The FP-Growth algorithm skips the
candidate itemset generation process by using a compact
tree structure to store itemset frequency information.
3. THE EXISTING APPROACH
This paper is inspired by Bhaskar et al.’s paper [8] in
KDD’10, which proposed an approach for releasing the top
k itemsets of a predefined length m. That is, among all
itemsets of length exactly m, one chooses the k most fre-
quent ones, and releases their frequencies. This method can
be easily extended to the case of releasing top k itemsets of
length at most m, instead of exactly m. This can then be
used to return top k most frequent itemsets by choosing an
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appropriatem. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only
existing approach that publishes frequent itemsets while sat-
isfying differential privacy. A key concept introduced in this
approach is the notion of Truncated Frequencies, we thus
call this approach the TF method.
The TF method has two steps. In the first step, one se-
lects which k itemsets to release. In the second step, one
releases the frequencies of these itemsets after adding noises
to them. The privacy budget ǫ is evenly divided between
these two steps. The second step is straightforward. Given
k itemsets, releasing their frequencies have sensitivity k
N
, as
adding or removing one transaction can affect the frequency
of each itemset by at most 1
N
. Thus adding noise accord-
ing to Lap
(
2k
Nǫ
)
to the frequency of each of the k itemsets
satisfies (ǫ/2)-differential privacy.
The main challenge lies in the first step, namely, selecting
the k most frequent itemsets. The TF method selects these
from the set of all itemsets of length at most m; we use U to
denote this set of candidate itemsets. The number of these
candidate itemsets is
|U | =
∑
i:1≤i≤m
(
|I|
i
)
≈ |I|m, (2)
which is exponential in m.
Because |U | is large, enumerating through all elements in
U can be computationally expensive. The key novelty in the
TF approach is to use the notion of truncated frequencies
to avoid explicitly enumerating through all itemsets in U .
The truncated frequency of X ∈ U is defined as fˆ(X) =
max(f(X), fk − γ), where fk is the frequency of the k’th
most frequent itemset in U , and γ is a parameter computed
using Equation (3) below.
The intuition is that for an itemset with frequency below
fk − γ, one does not need to explicitly consider the item-
set; instead, it suffices to use fk − γ as the upperbound of
the itemset’s frequency. The parameter γ must be selected
to ensure that an itemset of frequency less than fk − γ is
selected only with low probability; it is computed as follows:
γ =
4k
ǫN
(
ln
k
ρ
+ ln |U |
)
(3)
The value ρ bounds the error probability and should be be-
tween 0 and 1.
Two methods were proposed to select the k most frequent
itemsets from U using the truncated frequencies. The first
is to add Lap
(
4k
ǫN
)
to the truncated frequencies of all item-
sets in U , and then select the k with highest noisy frequen-
cies. The second method is to use repeated applications of
the Exponential Mechanism. One samples k times without
replacement, such that the probability of selecting an item-
set, X, is proportional to exp
(
ǫN
4k
fˆ(X)
)
. It is shown that
both methods satisfy (ǫ/2)-differential privacy. For both
methods, the algorithm explicitly considers only the item-
sets with frequencies > fk−γ, and estimates the probability
that it should select an itemset whose frequency is ≤ fk − γ
(i.e., with truncated frequency = fk−γ), and then randomly
samples such an itemset.
Furthermore, it is proven that the output of either method
provides the following utility guarantee: With probability
1− ρ, every itemset with true frequency at least fk + γ are
selected, and every selected itemset has true frequency at
least fk − γ.
3.1 Analysis of the TF Method
The TF method works well when k is small. However,
it scales poorly with larger k. To see why this is the case,
recall that the TF method enumerates only itemsets with
frequencies above fk − γ to prune the search space. When
fk − γ ≤ 0, i.e, when γ ≥ fk, this technique results in no
pruning at all, and the algorithm degenerates into explic-
itly enumerating through all elements of U . Furthermore,
the proven utility guarantee (e.g., every selected itemset has
frequency at least fk − γ) is meaningless when fk − γ ≤ 0.
Unfortunately, as Table 2(a) shows, in many datasets with
large k (k ≥ 100, or k ≥ 200), we have γ larger than, or very
close to fk. To see why, observe that
γ =
4k
ǫN
(
ln
k
ρ
+ ln |U |
)
>
4k
ǫN
(ln |U |) ≈ 4km ln |I|
ǫN
That is, γ grows linearly in km. When k is large, the
top k itemsets likely include many itemsets of sizes 3, 4, or
higher. If one chooses a smallm, then one misses all frequent
itemsets that of size greater than m. If one chooses a larger
m, e.g., 3 or higher, then the γ value is too large, rendering
the mechanism unfeasible.
We observe that a deeper reason why the TF method does
not scale is that when one needs to select the top k itemsets
from a large set U of candidates, the large size of U causes
two difficulties. The first is regarding the running time, i.e.,
a large |U | makes enumerating through all elements in U
unfeasible. The second difficulty is about accuracy, i.e., a
large |U | makes the selection of top k candidates from U
inaccurate. Even if every single low-frequency itemset in U
is chosen with only a small probability, the sheer number of
such low-frequency itemsets means that the k selected item-
sets likely include many infrequent ones. The TF technique
tries to address the running time challenge by pruning the
search space, but it does not address the accuracy challenge.
This addresses only one symptom caused by a larger candi-
date set, but not the root cause. In the end, even the goal
of improving running time cannot be achieved when |U | is
large, because the accuracy requirement forces a large γ.
4. THE PRIVBASIS METHOD
In this section, we introduce the PrivBasis method for
publishing the top k frequent itemsets. If one desires to
publish all itemsets above a given threshold θ, one can com-
pute the value k such that the k’th most frequent itemset
has frequency ≥ θ and the k + 1’th itemset has frequency
< θ, and then uses PrivBasis to find the top k frequent
itemsets.
4.1 Overview of PrivBasis
We observe that the key challenge of dealing with trans-
action datasets is their high dimensionality. The PrivBasis
approach can be viewed as meeting the challenge by project-
ing the input dataset D onto lower dimensions. For example,
let B be the set of ℓ most frequent items in D; projecting
D to items in B means removing from every transaction
all the items that are not in B. The ℓ items in B can be
viewed as ℓ binary attributes that partition the dataset into
2ℓ bins. Using the standard Laplacian mechanism, one can
obtain the noisy frequency of each bin, through which one
can reconstruct the frequencies of all subsets of B. For this
method to work, the value ℓ cannot be much larger than
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dataset N |I| avg |t| k λ λ2 λ3
retail 88162 16470 11.3 100 38 37 21
mushroom 8124 119 24 100 11 30 36
pumsb-star 49046 2088 50 200 17 31 50
kosarak 990002 41270 8.1 200 39 84 58
AOL 647377 2290685 34 200 171 29 0
dataset k fk ·N m |U | ≈
(|I|
m
)
γ ·N
retail 100 1192 1 16, 470 5768
mushroom 100 4464 2 7, 104 5433
pumsb-star 200 28613 3 1.5× 109 21235
kosarak 200 14142 2 8.5× 108 20733
AOL 200 12450 1 2.3× 106 16038
(a) Dataset parameters: avg |t| is the average transaction
length, λ is the number of unique items in the top k item-
sets, and λ2 (λ3, resp.) is the number of pairs (size-3
itemsets, resp.) in the top k itemsets. Note that we choose
ρ = 0.9, which requires utility guarantee only with the low
probability of 1− ρ = 0.1.
(b) Effectiveness of the TF approach due to
Bhaskar et al., when applied to selecting top k
itemsets that are of length at most m. When the
column γ · N is larger than fk · N , the truncated
frequency approach is completely ineffective.
Table 2: Effectiveness of the TF approach, and dataset parameters
a dozen. However, for many datasets, when recovering the
top k itemsets for k = 100, k = 200, or even larger k, one
needs to go beyond the first dozen or so most frequent items.
Thus one needs to choose more than one sets of items (i.e.,
dimensions) for projections. How to select these in a differ-
entially private fashion, and how to best utilize information
obtained from them are the main challenges that need to be
solved by the PrivBasis method.
Formalizing the above intuitions, we introduce the con-
cept of θ-basis sets of a transaction dataset.
Definition 2 (θ-Basis Set). Given a transaction
dataset D over items in I, and a threshold θ, we say that
B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bw}, where Bi ⊆ I for 1 ≤ i ≤ w, is a
θ-basis set for D, if and only if for any θ-frequent itemset
X ⊆ I, there exists Bi ∈ B, such that X ⊆ Bi. We say that
Bi covers X.
We call w the width of the basis set, ℓ = max1≤i≤w |Bi|
the length of the basis set, and each Bi a basis.
Given a dataset D and a θ-basis set B for it, we can privately
reconstruct with reasonable accuracy the frequencies of all
itemsets in the the following candidate set C(B).
Definition 3 (Candidate Set). The candidate set
given a θ-basis B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bw} is defined as
C(B) =
w⋃
i=1
{X|X ⊆ Bi}
That is, the candidate set C(B) is the set of all itemsets
that are covered by some basis Bi in B. When B is a θ-basis
set, all θ-frequent itemsets are in C(B).
At a high level, the PrivBasis method consists of the fol-
lowing steps.
1. Obtain λ, the number of unique items that are involved
in the k most frequent itemsets.
2. Obtain F , the λ most frequent items among I. The
desired goal (which can be approximately achieved) is
that F includes exactly the items that appear in the
top k itemsets.
3. Obtain P , a set of the most frequent pairs of items
among F . The desired goal is that P includes exactly
the pairs of items that appear in the top k itemsets.
4. Construct B, using F and P . The desired goal is that
B is a fk-basis set with small width and length.
5. Obtain noisy frequencies of itemsets in C(B); one can
then select the top k itemsets from C(B).
In the rest of this section, we present details of these steps.
We do this in a reverse order, first presenting Step 5 in Sec-
tion 4.2, then Step 4 in Section 4.3, and finally the complete
algorithm, including details of Steps 1 to 3 in Section 4.4.
4.2 Generating Noisy Counts for C(B)
Algorithm 1 gives the BasisFreq algorithm for comput-
ing the noisy counts of all itemsets in C(B). In the algo-
rithm we compute noisy counts, which can be translated
into frequencies easily. The key ideas of the algorithm are
as follows. Each basis Bi divides all possible transactions
into 2|Bi| mutually disjoint bins, one corresponding to each
subset of Bi. For each X ⊆ Bi, the bin corresponding to X
consists of all transactions that contain all items in X, but
no item in Bi \X.
Given a basis set B, adding noise Lap(w/ǫ) to each bin
count and outputting these noisy counts satisfy ǫ-differential
privacy. For each basis Bi, adding or removing a single
transaction can affect the count of exactly one bin by exactly
1. Hence the sensitivity of publishing all bin counts for one
basis is 1; and the sensitivity for publishing counts for all
bases is w. In Algorithm 1, lines 2 to 11 compute these noisy
bin frequencies.
From these frequencies, one can then recover the counts
of all itemsets in C. For example, a basis {a, b, c} divides all
transactions into 8 bins: {¬a,¬b,¬c} (not containing any
of a, b, c), {a,¬b,¬c}, · · · , {a, b, c}. The count of the item-
set {a, b} can then be obtained by summing up the counts
for the two bins {a, b,¬c} and {a, b, c}. Lines 12 to 26 in
Algorithm 1 compute the noisy counts for itemsets in C.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 is ǫ-differentially private.
Proof. The only part in Algorithm 1 that depends on
the dataset is computing the noisy bin counts b[i][X]. As
discussed above, publishing all bin counts has sensitivity
w/N . Line 4 adds Laplacian noise to satisfy ǫ-differential
privacy taking this sensitivity into consideration. Starting
from line 12, the algorithm only performs post-processing,
and does not access D again.
Running Time. We now analyze the running time of
Algorithm 1. The algorithm has four parts. The first part
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Algorithm 1 BasisFreq: Privately Releasing Frequent
Itemsets using Basis Sets
Input: Transactional dataset D, B = {B1, · · · , Bw}, k,
differential privacy budget ǫ.
Output: Top k frequent itemsets in C and their frequen-
cies.
1: function BasisFreq(D,B = {B1, · · · , Bw}, k, ǫ)
2: for i = 1→ w do
3: for j = 0→ 2|Bi| − 1 do
4: b[i][j] ← Lap (w
ǫ
)
5: end for
6: end for
7: for all t ∈ D do
8: for i = 1→ w do
9: b[i][t ∩ Bi]← b[i][t ∩Bi] + 1
10: end for
11: end for
12: C ← ∅
13: for i = 1→ w do
14: for all X ⊆ Bi do
15: nc ←∑Y⊆Bi|X⊆Y b[i][Y ]
16: nv ← 2|Bi|−|X|
17: if C(X) is undefined then
18: C(X).nc ← nc
19: C(X).v ← nv
20: else
21: v ← C(X).v
22: C(X).nc ← nv
v+nv
C(X).nc + v
v+nv
nc
23: C(X).v ← v·nv
v+nv
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
27: R← the k elements in X’s with highest C(X).nc
28: return R
29: end function
Comments
• The array element b[i][X] stores the noisy count of
the bin corresponding to itemset X and basis Bi. We
point out that a subset of Bi is easily converted to
binary number of |Bi| bits, which is an integer index
in 0..2|Bi | − 1.
• The rationale behind lines 21-23 are explained in Sec-
tion 4.2 in the “Noisy Frequency Accuracy Analysis”
paragraph.
(lines 2 to 6) initializes the array b, which takes O(w2ℓ)
time. The second part (lines 7 to 11) scans the dataset D
and matches each transaction with each basis, and takes
time O(w|D|), where |D| is the sum of the lengths of all
transactions in D. The third part (lines 12 to 26) computes
the noisy counts of itemsets in the candidate set C. This
part’s runtime is dominated by line 15, which for each X ⊆
Bi requires O(2
|Bi |−|X|) operations. The total number of
operations involved for each basis Bi is
|Bi|∑
j=1
(
|Bi|
j
)
2|Bi|−j = 3|Bi| − 2|Bi|
Thus the third part takes time O(w3ℓ). The last part
(line 27) sorts the noisy counts of itemset in C to select
top k and takes time O(wℓ(logw)2ℓ). Thus Algorithm 1 has
time complexity O(w|D| + w3ℓ). For large dataset, we will
have ℓ < log3 |D|, and the running time is dominated by
O(w|D|). This analysis shows that w is a linear factor on
the running time, while ℓ has an exponential effect. In our
experiments we limit ℓ to be at most 12, and often 10 or
smaller.
Accuracy Analysis. We now analyze the accuracy of
the noisy frequencies obtained via Algorithm 1. Let nfi (X)
denote the noisy frequency of an itemset X from a basis Bi.
We use the Error Variance as the measure of accuracy. That
is, we consider
EV [nfi (X)] = Var (|nfi (X)− f(X)|)
When computing nfi (X), one sums up 2
|Bi|−|X| noisy
counts, each with noise independently generated according
to Lap
(
w
ǫN
)
, which has variance 2w
2
ǫ2N2
. We thus have:
EV [nfi (X)] = 2
|Bi|−|X|+1 w
2
ǫ2N2
(4)
When two or more bases overlap, some itemsets may be
subsets of more than one bases, and one thus obtains mul-
tiple noisy counts of such an itemset, one from each basis
including the itemset. In this case, these counts can be
combined to obtain a more accurate count. Given two noisy
counts of the itemset X, nf 1 with error variances v1 and nf 2
with error variance v2, the optimal way to combine them
is to use v2
v1+v2
nf 1 +
v1
v1+v2
nf 2, resulting in error variance
v1v2
v1+v2
. This weighted averaging is done in lines 22 and 23.
From Equation (4), it is easy to see that the worst-case
error variance among all X and all Bi is 2
ℓ w2
ǫ2N2
. To mini-
mize such worst-case error variance, one wants to minimize
w22ℓ.
Alternatively, one may want to minimize average-case er-
ror variance. Given a basis set B, and a set Q of itemsets,
we can compute the average-case error variance for using B
to obtain noisy frequencies for itemsets in Q as follows. For
each itemset X ∈ Q, if it is covered by a single basis Bi, then
the error variance can be computed using Equation 4. If X
is covered by more than one bases, one can also computed
the error variance of the weighted average method. One can
then take an average of the computed error variance for all
itemsets in Q.
We now consider a special case where one wants to ob-
tain noisy frequencies for a set Q of k individual items, and
show what basis set minimizes both the worst-case and the
average-case error variance. One extreme is to use one basis
for each item in Q. As a result, one adds Laplacian noise
to the k counts, and has sensitivity k. The noise has dis-
tribution Lap
(
k
ǫ
)
, resulting in error variance of k2V , where
V = 2
ǫ2
. Now assume that the k items are divided into bases
of size ℓ, then we have w = k/ℓ bases. The noise variance
for the frequency of each item is thus
w22ℓ−1V =
2ℓ−1
ℓ2
k2V.
Note that 2
ℓ−1
ℓ2
is minimized at ℓ = 3, where it equals 4/9.
Thus one obtains more than half reduction in the error vari-
ance when compared with the direct method.
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4.3 Constructing Basis Sets
We now discuss how to construct a good θ-basis set for
θ = fk, the frequency of the k-th most frequent itemset.
Given a transaction dataset D and a threshold θ, many
θ-basis sets exist. As discussed above, we desire θ-basis sets
that have both small width and small length. We now in-
vestigate some properties of θ-basis sets, which help us con-
struct θ-basis sets.
Proposition 2. The set B1 = {{x1, · · · , xλ}}, where
x1, · · · , xλ are all the items that are θ-frequent, is a θ-basis
set of D of width 1 and length λ.
Proof. For any θ-frequent itemset X, all items in X
must be θ-frequent, and therefore X ⊆ B1.
We use λ to denote the number of unique items in the top
k itemsets. When λ is small, then this basis-set would work
fine. However, when λ is large, we need other methods.
Below we explore additional properties of θ-basis sets.
Proposition 3. The set Bm = {B1, B2, · · · , Bw}, where
B1, B2, · · · , Bw are all the maximal θ-frequent itemsets, is a
θ-basis set. Furthermore, any θ-basis set must have length
at least as large as the length of Bm.
Proof. Recall that a maximal frequent itemset is a θ-
frequent itemset such that any superset of it is not θ-
frequent. The length of this θ-basis set equals the size of
the largest maximal θ-frequent itemset. This θ-basis set has
the smallest length among all θ-basis sets, because every θ-
basis set must include a basis that is a superset of the largest
maximal θ-frequent itemset.
Proposition 4. Given a θ-basis set B =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bw}, merging any Bi and Bj (i.e., re-
place Bi and Bj with Bi ∪ Bj in B) results in another
θ-basis set of width w − 1.
Propositions 3 and 4 together give one way to construct
good basis sets. Given the maximal frequent itemsets, one
can merge them as needed. The challenge is that it is un-
clear how to publish the set of all maximal frequent itemsets
while satisfying differential privacy. Below we show a way to
privately over-approximate the maximal frequent itemsets.
Definition 4. Let F be the set of θ-frequent items, and
P be the set of all θ-frequent pairs of items. Observe that P
involves only items in F . We define the θ-frequent pairs
graph to be the graph where each node corresponding to an
item in F and each edge corresponds to a frequent pair in
P .
We are interested in the maximal maximal cliques in
the θ-frequent graph. A maximal clique, sometimes called
inclusion-maximal, is a clique that is not included in a
larger clique. The classic algorithm for finding all maxi-
mum cliques is the Bron-Kerbosch Algorithm [12], which is
widely used in application areas of graph algorithms.
Proposition 5. Given D, the set of all maximal cliques
in D’s θ-frequent pairs graph form a θ-basis-set of D.
Proof. For any θ-frequent item x, x ∈ F belongs to some
maximal clique. For any θ-frequent itemset X of size ≥ 2,
by the apriori principle all items in X and all pairs of items
in X must be θ-frequent, thus X corresponds to a clique in
the θ-frequent pairs graph, which must be included in some
maximal clique.
The above proof also shows that each θ-frequent itemset
must be a subset of some maximal clique of the θ-frequent
pair graph; however, a maximal clique may not be a θ-
frequent itemset. For example, it may be the case that
pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 4} are all θ-frequent, but the item-
set {1, 2, 3} is not θ-frequent. Thus, the maximal cliques
over-approximate the maximal frequent itemsets.
We use Propositions 5 and 4 to construct a basis set. Algo-
rithm 2 gives the algorithm for constructing a basis set that
covers all maximal cliques in the graph constructed from F
and P , while attempting to minimize the average-case error
variance (EV) for pairs in P and items in F \ P , which we
use to denote items that appear in F , but not in P .
The algorithm starts with a basis set that has two parts:
B1 includes the maximal cliques of size at least 2; B2 in-
cludes items in F \ P grouped into itemsets of size 3 each,
with possibly 1 or 2 items left. The algorithm then greedily
merges bases in B1, to reduce the EV. After this step, the
algorithm tries to remove some basis in B2 can distribute
the items in them elsewhere, if doing so reduces the EV.
Algorithm 2 ConstructBasisSet: Construct a Basis Set
Using Frequent Items and Pairs
Input: F , frequent items, and P , frequent pairs.
Output: B, a basis set covering all maximal cliques in
the graph (F, P ).
1: function ConstructBasisSet(F, P )
2: B1 ← all maximal cliques of size at least 2 in the
graph given by P
3: B2 ← items in F but not in P , divided into the
smallest number of itemsets such that each contains at
most 3 items
4: Repeatedly find Bi, Bj ∈ B1 such that merging Bi
and Bj results in the largest reduction of average-case
error variance (EV) when using B = B1 ∪B2 to obtain
frequencies of itemsets in F and P ; and update B1 by
merging Bi, Bj ; stop when no merging reduces EV
5: Repeatedly find Bi ∈ B2 such that removing Bi and
moving items in Bi to bases in B1 ∪ B2 with smallest
sizes results in the largest EV-reduction; updateB when
Bi is found; stop when no such Bi can be found
6: return B = B1 ∪B2
7: end function
4.4 Putting Things Together for PrivBasis
Now we are able to put all the pieces together for the
PrivBasis method. The algorithm is given in Algorithm 3.
Recall that the algorithm has five steps, as given in Sec-
tion 4.1: (1) Get lambda; (2) Get frequent items; (3) Get
frequent pairs; (4) Construct the basis set; (5) Get noisy
counts.
Privacy Budget Allocation. The privacy budget ǫ must
be divided among the steps 1, 2, 3, 5. Step 4 does not access
the dataset D, and only processes the outputs of earlier
steps. We divide the privacy budget into three portions:
α1ǫ is used for Step 1 (obtaining λ), α2ǫ is used for Steps
2 and 3 combined, α3ǫ is used for Step 5. In our experi-
ments, we chose α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.4, and α3 = 0.5 for all
datasets. These choices were not tuned, and may not be
1345
Algorithm 3 PrivBasis: Privately Releasing Frequent
Itemsets
Input: Transactional dataset D, items I, k, differential
privacy budget ǫ.
Algorithmic Parameters: α1 + α2 + α3 = 1 decides
what proportions of the privacy budget are allocated to
the different steps. We use α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.4, α3 = 0.5.
Parameter η, which we set at either 1.1 or 1.2, is the safety
margin parameter.
1: function PrivBasisMain(D, I, k, ǫ)
2: λ← GetLambda(D, I, k, α1ǫ)
3: if λ ≤ 12 then
4: F ← GetFreqItems(D, I, λ, α2ǫ)
5: return BasisFreq(D, {F}, k, (1− α1 − α2)ǫ)
6: else
7: λ2 = η · k − λ
8: λ2 ← λ2/
√
max(1, λ2/λ)
9: β1 ← α2 · λ/(λ+ λ2)
10: β2 ← α2 − β1
11: F ← GetFreqElements(D, I, λ, β1ǫ)
12: U ← all pairs of items in F
13: P ← GetFreqElements(D,U, λ2, β2ǫ)
14: B = ConstrBasis(F, P )
15: return BasisFreq(D,B, k, (1− α1 − α2)ǫ)
16: end if
17: end function
18: function GetLambda(D, I, k, ǫ)
19: N ← number of transactions in D
20: k1 ← ⌈k · η⌉
21: θ ← frequency of k1’th itemset
22: for i = 1→ |I | do
23: f ← frequency of i’th item
24: p[i]← e(1−|f−θ|)·N·ǫ/2
25: end for
26: λ← sample i ∈ [1..|I |] according to p[i]
27: return λ
28: end function
29: function GetFreqElements(D,U, λ, ǫ)
30: N ← number of transactions in D
31: for i = 1→ |U | do
32: f ← frequency of U [i]
33: p[i]← ef ·ǫ/λ
34: end for
35: for i = 1→ λ do
36: X[i]←sample from U [i] according to p[i]
37: remove X[i] from U
38: end for
39: return X
40: end function
optimal; it appears that the optimal allocation depends on
characteristics of the dataset D and the value k.
Step 3 is needed only when λ, the number of unique items
that appear in the top k frequent itemsets, is > 12. Recall
that when λ ≤ 12, we construct B to consist of a single
basis that includes the λ most frequent items, and do not
need step (3) to obtain frequent pairs. When λ is small, we
let Step 2 use the whole of α2ǫ. When Step 3 is needed, the
privacy budget α2ǫ must be allocated between Steps 2 and
3. This allocation is done according to how many frequent
items and pairs we want to get. To obtain λ most frequent
items, and λ2 most frequent pairs, Step 2 gets λ/(λ + λ2)
portion of α2ǫ, and Step 3 gets the rest.
Step 1: Get λ. Step 1 is done using the GetLambda
function in Algorithm 3. Intuitively, one can use the ex-
ponential method to sample j from {1, 2, · · · , k} with the
following quality function.
q(D, i) = (1− |fk − fitemj |)N
where fitemj is the frequency of the j’th most frequent item.
That is, we want to choose j such that the j’th most frequent
item has frequency closest to that of the k’th most frequent
itemset.
The sensitivity of the above quality function is 1, be-
cause adding or removing a transaction can affect fk by
at most 1/N and fitemj by at most 1/N . Furthermore, fk
and fitemj cannot change in different directions (i.e., one
increases while the other decreases).
In Algorithm 3, rather than using fk in the above quality
function, we use fk1 , where k1 = k ·η, and η is a safety mar-
gin parameter that we set at either 1.1 or 1.2, depending on
k. The reason for doing this is to avoid the error in which
the obtained λ is too small, because then we may miss a sig-
nificant number of top k itemsets with basis set constructed
with top λ items. When the obtained λ is slightly larger
than the correct value, this will just cause the privacy bud-
get to be divided somewhat thinner, an effect we can tolerate
better.
Steps 2 and 3: Get frequent items and pairs. Both
Steps 2 and 3 use the GetFreqElements function, which
privately selects a number of itemsets with highest frequen-
cies from a set U . It uses repeated sampling without re-
placement, where each sampling step uses the exponential
method with the frequency of each itemset as its quality.
In Step 2, we are selecting from all items in I , thus the
candidate set size is |I |, the resulting set is F . In Step 3, we
only need to select pairs of items in F ; thus, the set U from
which we are selecting has only
(
λ
2
)
elements, which is quite
small.
When determining λ2, the number of frequent pairs in the
top k itemsets, the naive method is to set λ2 = η · k − λ.
This, however, is not ideal. In Table 2(b), we see that for the
pumsb-star dataset, the top 100 itemsets include 17 items
and 31 pairs. We desire a λ2 value to be larger than 31, but
not too large. Setting λ2 = η·k−λ results a value close to 100
for η = 1.2. Obtaining top 100 pairs and constructing basis
to cover them is inaccurate, both because each pair must
be selected with less privacy budget, and because having to
cover 100 pairs results in larger basis. While the best value
of λ2 depends on the dataset, we use the following heuristic
formula.
λ2 ← λ
′
2√
max(1, λ′2/λ)
,where λ′2 = η · k − λ
The intuition is that when the ratio of λ′2/λ is large, then
we expect that a significant proportion of the top λ items
to be non-pairs, so we divide λ′2 by the square root of the
ratio. For the pumsb-star dataset, when the noisy λ = 20,
the λ2 value computed as above equals 44.
As all data-dependent step in Algorithm 3 satisfies differ-
ential privacy, we have the following theorem.
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Theorem 6. Algorithm 3 is ǫ-differentially private.
5. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate the efficacy of our ap-
proach through extensive experimental evaluation on a num-
ber of real datasets. We begin by describing the datasets we
use as well as the utility measures we employ. We then
present our experimental results.
Datasets To facilitate experimental evaluation, we run our
algorithm on the following 5 datasets. Table 2(b) on page
provides a description of the number of transactions in each
datasets, the number of distinct items, as well as the average
transaction length.
• Retail Dataset [2]. This is a retail market basket data
from an anonymous Belgian retail store. Each trans-
action in the dataset is a set of items in one receipt
and there are 88,162 receipts in total.
• Mushroom Dataset [2]. In this dataset, each record de-
scribes the physical attributes such as color of a single
mushroom.
• AOL Search Log Dataset [1]. Each line of this dataset
contains the randomly assigned userID, the search
query string, the time stamp and the clicked URL. We
preprocess the logs by removing the stop words and
performing word stemming. By treating each query
keyword as an item, we transform the preprocessed
dataset into a transaction dataset by grouping the
search query keywords of the same userID into one
transaction.
• Pumsb star Dataset [2]. The Pumsb dataset is cen-
sus data from PUMS (Public Use Microdata Sample).
Pumsb star represents a subset of this dataset suitable
for data mining purposes.
• Kosarak Dataset [2]. Kosarak contains the click-
stream data of a Hungarian online news website. Each
transaction is a click stream from a user.
Utility Measures We evaluate the utility by employing
the following standard metrics.
• False negative rate: This measures the fraction of ac-
tual frequent itemsets which do not appear in the pub-
lished result
FNR =
FalseNegatives
k
.
We point out that this is the same as the False Positive
Rate, the fraction of identified top k itemsets that are
not in the actual top k.
• Relative error of published itemset counts: This mea-
sures the error with respect to the actual itemset fre-
quency in the dataset. This is calculated over all pub-
lished frequent itemsets.
RE = medianX
|nf(X) − f(X)|
f(X)
.
5.1 Experimental Results
We compare the efficacy of our approach described in Al-
gorithm 3 to the method in [8], which is described in Sec-
tion 3. We use PB (for PrivBasis) to denote our method,
and TF (for Truncated Frequency) to denote the method
in [8].
Our algorithm is adaptive based on the nature of the
dataset involved and the value of k desired. More specifi-
cally, the value of λ determines how the basis set is selected.
We thus roughly divide our experiments into three groups
to demonstrate the efficacy of our algorithm under different
scenarios.
As we point out in Section 3, the TF algorithm becomes
inaccurate, and, in some cases, cannot be applied for large
values of m. Hence, we test different values of m and report
the results for the value that provides the best precision.
In our experiments, we vary ǫ and report the results. We
repeat all our experiments 3 times and report the mean of
the results as well the standard error.
Small λ, single basis. When λ is small, our PB method
uses a single basis with all the top λ frequent items. We
are able to observe this scenario with the Mushroom and
Pumbs star datasets with values of k less than 150. The
results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The results on
both datasets show that the PB method consistently and
significantly out-performs the TF method both in terms of
false negative rate and relative error. In fact, the perfor-
mance of PB with larger k significantly outperforms that of
TF with a smaller k.
For both datasets, the FNR for PB is close to 0 even when
ǫ is 0.5. In addition, the relative error is consistently small
which indicates that we can get relatively high accuracy for
the released itemset counts. On the other hand, the TF
method has unacceptably large FNR both for larger k and
for smaller ǫ. For example, for getting the top 100 itemsets
in the Mushroom dataset, TF has FNR at over 0.6 even
when ǫ = 1; and for getting the top 150 itemsets in the
Pumsb Star dataset, TF has FNR at over 0.7 even when
ǫ = 1. For obtaining the top 50 itemsets, at ǫ = 0.5, TF
has FNR at about 0.6 and 0.4 for the two datasets. This
confirms our analysis in Section 3.
Larger λ, small number of basis. For larger and sparser
datasets, λ can be large enough to make the construction of
a single basis unfeasible. This is the case for the retail and
kosarak datasets. We run our experiments and construct
bases of length 7 each as described by our algorithm in the
previous section. The results for these datasets are shown in
Figure 3 and Figure 4. We again see that PB out-performs
TF. While the performance of PB is accurate even when
k = 400, the PB method has acceptance FNR only for k =
100 and ǫ ≥ 0.5. An interesting observation here is that for
the retail dataset, the FNR is worse than the other datasets
on all accounts. Upon investigation, we realized that this is
mainly due to the nature of the dataset. For larger k, there
are many itemsets whose frequencies are lower than fk but
very close fk. Hence the ratio of the probability of selecting
the correct top k itemsets over the other is not large.
λ ≈ k, large number of basis. For very sparse datasets,
such as search log datasets, the number of frequent itemsets
are largely dominated by frequent items. This is the case for
the AOL dataset, for which the top 200 frequent itemsets
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Figure 1: Results of the PrivBasis (PB) method and the Truncated Frequency (TF) method for the Mushroom
dataset, with k = 50 and k = 100; m is the maximum frequent itemset length that provides the highest precision
for TF.
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Figure 2: Results of PB and TF for the Pumsb Star dataset, with k = 50 and k = 150; m is the maximum
frequent itemset length that provides the highest precision for TF.
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Figure 3: Results of PB and TF for the Retail dataset, with k = 50 and k = 100; m is the maximum frequent
itemset length that provides the highest precision for TF.
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Figure 4: Results for the Kosarak dataset, first row showing results for k = 100 and k = 200; second row
showing results for k = 300 and k = 400; m is the maximum frequent itemset length that provides the highest
precision for TF.
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Figure 5: Results for PB and TF the AOL dataset, with k = 100 and k = 200; m is the maximum frequent
itemset length that provides the highest precision for TF.
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contain 171 singletons and 29 pairs. For the TF method, it
is unfeasible to run the algorithm for m > 1 and produce
accurate results since |I| is quite large. The results are shown
in Figure 5. This is the dataset where TF performs closest to
PB, because while TF degenerates into finding all frequent
singleton items, this can cover a large number of frequent
itemsets. And when the problem more or less degenerates
into finding the top k items, the advantage of PB over TF
is small.
6. RELATED WORK
Differential privacy was presented in a series of papers
[15, 18, 9, 17, 16], and methods of satisfying it are presented
in [16, 30, 28]. Work on differential privacy has initially
focused on answering statistical queries; however, recent lit-
erature has focused on using differential privacy for data
publishing scenarios [10, 19]. Differential privacy has also
been employed to release contingency table [7], publish his-
tograms [23, 33], and privately match records [25]. McSh-
erry and Mironov [27] present differentially private recom-
mendation algorithms in Netflix Prize competition. More
recently, differential privacy has been adapted to release ac-
curate data mining models and results [19, 29, 8].
The existing work most related to ours is Bhaskar et al.
[8], which releases differentially private frequent itemsets.
We have discussed this approach in detail in Section 2.
Atzori et al. [6] investigated the problem of modifying the
supports of frequent itemsets, while concealing the sensitive
information of individuals. It requires that each pattern
derived from the released frequent itemsets have a support
of either 0 or at least k, a positive integer threshold. This
solution is based k-anonymity [31] privacy model, which is
a much weaker privacy notion than differential privacy.
Chen et al. [14] studied the releasing of transaction
dataset while satisfying differential privacy. They present
an algorithm, which partitions the transaction dataset in a
top-down fashion guided by a context-free taxonomy tree,
and reports the noisy counts of the transactions at the
leaf level. This method generates a synthetic transaction
dataset, which can be then used to mine the top k frequent
itemsets. For the datasets we consider in this paper, this
method generates either an empty synthetic dataset or a
dataset that is highly inaccurate. An analysis of the method
shows that this method can provide reasonable performance
only when the number of items is small. (One dataset used
in [14] for evaluation is the MSNBC dataset which has 17
items and about 1 million transactions.)
Work on releasing differentially private private search logs,
including the AOL search log dataset, has been addressed
in [26] and [21]. These works differ from our work in that
they focus on releasing the top frequent keywords that oc-
cur in the search logs, and does not release any information
about how frequent itemsets with size 2 or higher. This is
essentially mining for frequent itemsets of length 1. Another
difference is that their approach assume that the keywords
in the dataset are not public knowledge, whereas we assume
I is public. As a result, their approach satisfies a relaxed
version of differential privacy similar to the notion of (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
In addition, there is another series of works [32, 24, 20,
34, 13, 14] on publishing anonymized transaction data, in-
stead of releasing privacy-preserving mining results [19, 29,
8, 6]. Terrovitis et al. [32] apply a relaxation of k-anonymity
on transaction dataset, by requiring that for each itemset
with the length of at most m, the number of transactions in
the dataset containing this itemset is either 0 or at least k.
He and Naughton [24] enhance [32] by strictly imposing k-
anonymity. The two solutions [32, 24] treat each item in the
dataset equally. Different from them, the schemes [20, 34] di-
vide items into sensitive and non-sensitive ones, and assume
that an adversary can only get the background knowledge
about the non-sensitive items. The algorithms in [20, 34]
ensure that the inference from non-sensitive items to a sen-
sitive one is lower than a threshold. Cao et al. [13] relax the
assumption, and allow an attacker to include sensitive items
in his/her background knowledge. They provide a privacy
principle ρ-uncertainty, which postulates that the confidence
of inferring a sensitive item from any itemset (consisting of
both sensitive and non-sensitive items) be lower than ρ, a
threshold.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced PrivBasis, a novel
method of publishing frequent itemsets with differential pri-
vacy guarantees. The intuition behind PrivBasis is simple.
Given some minimum support threshold, θ, one can con-
struct a basis set B = {B1, B2, . . . , Bw} such that any item-
set with frequency higher than θ is a subset of some basis Bi.
We have introduced techniques for privately constructing
basis sets, and for privately reconstructing the frequencies of
all subsets of Bi’s with reasonable accuracy. One can then
select the most frequent itemsets from such reconstructed
subsets. We have conducted experiments on 5 real datasets
commonly used for frequent itemset mining purposes, and
the results show that our approach greatly outperforms the
current state of the art. Our approach can be viewed as a
dimension reduction to deal with the curse of dimensionality
in private data analysis and data anonymization.
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